Klein, Colin and Barron, Andrew B. (2016) Insects have the capacity for subjective
experience. Animal Sentience 9(1)
DOI: 10.51291/2377-7478.1113

Date of submission: 2016-06-25
Date of acceptance: 2016-07-11

This article has appeared in the journal Animal
Sentience, a peer-reviewed journal on animal
cognition and feeling. It has been made open access,
free for all, by WellBeing International and deposited
in the WBI Studies Repository. For more information,
please contact
wbisr-info@wellbeingintl.org.

Call for Commentary: Animal Sentience publishes Open Peer Commentary on all accepted target
articles. Target articles are peer-reviewed. Commentaries are editorially reviewed. There are
submitted commentaries as well as invited commentaries. Commentaries appear as soon as they
have been revised and accepted. Target article authors may respond to their commentaries
individually or in a joint response to multiple commentaries.
Instructions: http://animalstudiesrepository.org/animsent/guidelines.html

Insects have the capacity for subjective experience
Colin Klein1* & Andrew B. Barron2*
1Department

2Department

of Philosophy, Macquarie University
of Biological Sciences, Macquarie University
*equal authorship contribution

Abstract: To what degree are non-human animals conscious? We propose that the most
meaningful way to approach this question is from the perspective of functional
neurobiology. Here we focus on subjective experience, which is a basic awareness of the
world without further reflection on that awareness. This is considered the most basic form
of consciousness. Tellingly, this capacity is supported by the integrated midbrain and basal
ganglia structures, which are among the oldest and most highly conserved brain systems
in vertebrates. A reasonable inference is that the capacity for subjective experience is both
widespread and evolutionarily old within the vertebrate lineage. We argue that the insect
brain supports functions analogous to those of the vertebrate midbrain and hence that
insects may also have a capacity for subjective experience. We discuss the features of
neural systems which can and cannot be expected to support this capacity as well as the
relationship between our arguments based on neurobiological mechanism and our
approach to the “hard problem” of conscious experience.
Keywords: subjective experience, primary consciousness, vertebrate midbrain, superior
colliculus, invertebrate, insect
Colin Klein is Senior Lecturer in the Department of Philosophy
at Macquarie University. He works on philosophy of
neuroscience with a side interest in the perception of pain and
other homeostatically relevant states. In 2014 he received an
ARC Future Fellowship to look at interventionist approaches to
cognitive neuroscience. http://www.colinklein.org
Andrew B. Barron is Associate Professor in the Department
of Biological Sciences at Macquarie University. With his team
at Macquarie, he is exploring the neurobiology of major
behavioural systems such as memory, goal-directed
behaviour and stress from a comparative and evolutionary
perspective. In 2015 he was awarded an ARC Future
Fellowship to develop a computational model of the honey
bee brain. http://bio.mq.edu.au/research/groups/cognitiveneuroethology/dr-andrew-barron/

Animal Sentience 2016.100: Klein & Barron on Insect Experience

1. Introduction
What follows is a synopsis of our argument in Barron & Klein (2016). Our intention here
is both to summarize our arguments from comparative functional neurobiology that
insects have subjective experience as well as to expand upon and clarify some points from
our previous article. Here we provide some further discussion of why we believe the
insect brain is capable of subjective experience and of the features of nervous system
organization which do and do not have this capacity. We conclude with reflections on the
relationship between our structural arguments and the so-called “hard problem of
consciousness” (Chalmers, 1996).
2. Consciousness and Subjective Experience
Consciousness is a complex, multifaceted phenomenon (Bayne, Hohwy, & Owen, 2016).
Terminology to describe consciousness has proliferated more quickly than our
understanding of the phenomenon. Most authors, however, mark off a very basic sense of
“conscious” that refers to the basic capacity to have subjective experience (Morin, 2006).
In Nagel’s (1974) familiar term of art, there is “something it is like” to be an organism with
subjective experience. Organisms capable of subjective experience do more than merely
react: they have a perspective on the world with a unique phenomenological feel.
We distinguish this minimal level of consciousness from more demanding conscious
relations. We think it is possible to have subjective experience without higher-order
thoughts (Edelman, 2003; Rosenthal, 2005), self-awareness of oneself as a subject
(Christoff, Cosmelli, Legrand, & Thompson, 2011; Morin, 2006), or reportable access to
one’s own phenomenal states (Block, 1995). We think, in short, that it is possible to simply
be aware, with no further reflection.
Such a distinction is, of course, philosophically contentious. Some believe that subjective
experience requires heavier capacities for self-reflection. We justify adopting this
distinction in three ways. First, we think that this is the modal position among
philosophers and consciousness scientists. Second, adopting such a distinction corrects
for potential anthropocentric bias. Third, the distinction alone does not secure our
conclusion. We argue that insects have the capacity for subjective experience. Even those
who think that sentience without self-reflection is possible are wary of including insects
on our side of the line. Hence work remains to be done.
In humans, the capacity for subjective experience is dissociable from the capacity for selfreflexive consciousness. While the latter is dependent on cortical and midbrain structures
(Damasio, 1999), several authors have argued that the former is supported by the
midbrain and subcortical structures (Damasio & Carvalho, 2013; Mashour & Alkire, 2013;
Merker, 2005, 2007; B. Merker, 2013; Parvizi & Damasio, 2001; Penfield & Jasper, 1954).
We rely especially on the work of Bjorn Merker (2007), who draws on evidence from
anesthesia, vegetative state research, developmental disorders, brain damage and lesion
studies to create a compelling argument that the integrated structures of the vertebrate
midbrain are sufficient to support the capacity for subjective experience in humans.
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Yet while cortical damage can profoundly affect the content of conscious experience, it
seems that there is no part of the cortex upon which the capacity for consciousness
reliably depends (Damasio, Damasio, & Tranel, 2012; Damasio & Van Hoesen, 1983;
Friedman-Hill, Robertson, & Treisman, 1995; Herbet et al., 2014; Kapur et al., 1994;
Merker, 2007; Penfield & Jasper, 1954; Philippi et al., 2012). By contrast, the basic capacity
for subjective experience is sensitive to damage to midbrain structures (Merker, 2007).
The primary locus of action of many global anesthetics is subcortical (Alkire, Hudetz, &
Tononi, 2008; Gili et al., 2013). Emergence from anesthesia (Långsjö et al., 2012; Mashour
& Alkire, 2013), and coma or vegetative state (Schiff, 2010) are similarly predicted by the
reengagement of subcortical structures.
Note here the important distinction between the capacity for subjective experience and
the particular contents of experience at a given time. The human cortex obviously makes
a considerable contribution to what we are aware of. Cortical damage may appear to
remove whole categories of conscious content, but determining the actual effects of such
damage requires careful investigation, given the complexity of inhibitory interactions
with sub-cortical regions (Sprague, 1966). Similarly, there ought to be considerable
variation in conscious content across phyla. Yet these are all variations which require the
capacity for subjective experience in the first place.
The evidence is thus that the basic capacity for subjective experience is supported by
subcortical structures. Why might this be the case? We adopt a proposal put forward by
Merker (2007), who offers a functional proposal for the midbrain and subcortical basal
ganglia structures that explains their role in subjective experience. These structures
combine processed sensory information on the state and structure of the environment
with processed information on the homeostatic needs of the organism. The outcome is a
unified multimodal neural model of the agent within its environment, which is weighted
by the current needs and state of the agent. Within the midbrain, different structures
perform different roles in this information economy (Figure 1). This modeling gives the
organism a unique, unified perspective on the world. This, argues Merker, is what makes
subjective experience possible.
Two features of this proposal are particularly relevant for our argument. First, the
integrated processing of spatial information in the midbrain enables a mobile animal with
spatial senses to solve the so-called re-afference problem (von Holst & Mittelstaedt, 1950).
A moving animal must disambiguate environmental movement from the sensory input
caused by its own motion relative to the environment. For active animals with welldeveloped spatial senses, it is computationally more effective to resolve the re-afference
problem once in a unified sensory model than to resolve it in a dispersed and peripheral
way for each sense independently. In addition, different senses contribute different
information on how the body is moving; thus re-afference can be resolved with greater
accuracy and precision by integrating information from multiple senses (Merker, 2005).
In vertebrates, the layered tectum (or superior colliculus (SC) in mammals) of the roof of
the midbrain receives processed and topographically organized input from all spatially
structured senses, including vision, auditory, and somatosensory inputs (Damasio &
Carvalho, 2013; Harting, Updyke, & Van Lieshout, 1992; Klier, Wang, & Crawford, 2001;
McHaffie, Stanford, Stein, Coizet, & Redgrave, 2005; Merker, 2007). In mammals, inputs to
the SC include inputs from the vestibular system (Frens, Suzuki, Scherberger, Hepp, &
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Henn, 1998), information on eye position (Groh & Sparks, 1996; Knox & Donaldson, 1995;
Van Opstal, Hepp, Suzuki, & Henn, 1995), and somatosensation (Merker, 2007). This
allows the influence of self-motion on the sensory fields to be factored out of the
constructed sensory model of the environment (Sparks, 1988). Hence the SC is vital for
organizing motion in space, for directed attention, and for reaching and grasping for
targets (Horowitz & Newsome, 1999; Krauzlis, Liston, & Carello, 2004; McPeek & Keller,
2004; Zenon & Krauzlis, 2012).

Figure 1: The vertebrate behavioral core control system. Following Merker
(2007), autonomous animal decision making can be considered to involve three
related domains: motivation, target selection, and action selection (A). These
domains can be resolved and decisions can be made by an integrated neural system
that contains information on the state of self, self-movement, environmental state,
and structure and memory of prior experience. These capacities are supported by
different midbrain structures (B – shown here not to scale). As a simplification,
regions are colored according to their primary function(s) described in A. The
superior colliculus (part of the tectum (TEC) forming the roof of the midbrain)
processes multisensory spatial information (Merker 2007). Hypothalamic
structures (Hyp) and associated nuclei, the pituitary (pt) and mammillary bodies
(M) collate information on the physiological status of the organism referenced with
prior experience, to identify needs to maintain a homeostatic optimum (Damasio
& Carvalho, 2013; Swanson, 2000). Integrative structures within the midbrain and
basal ganglia, including the periaqueductal grey (P), substantia nigra (N), thalamus
(Tha), striatum (St) and midbrain reticular formation (MR), integrate these
sources of information with forms of memory to update relevance to the organism
according to prior experience (McHaffie et al., 2005; Merker, 2007).
The mammalian SC thus acts as a point of convergence for spatially structured sensory
information, including information about the position, orientation, and movement of the
body (Masino, 1992; May, 2006; Merker, 2005; Sparks, 1988; Zenon & Krauzlis, 2012).
Processing within the SC creates a neural model of the mobile animal in space, which is
essential for resolving decisions about how to react to resources around the animal.
The second relevant feature of the midbrain is that information integration within it
allows for efficient action selection in complex environments. Merker (2007) has
described the functions of the vertebrate midbrain as a “behavioral core control system.”
The midbrain supports autonomous decision making, as well as serving as the “final
common pathway” for action planning. This is important, since adaptive behavior
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requires the ability to select between competing drives in rapidly changing environments
(Jékely, Keijzer, & Godfrey-Smith, 2015).
The interacting systems of the midbrain and basal ganglia support resolution of
competing behavioral options by compiling information on the location and availability of
resources, the meaning and relevance of stimuli to the organism, and its physiological
needs (Figure 1). The hypothalamic structures and associated nuclei that form the floor
of the midbrain collate information on the physiological status of the organism (Swanson,
2000). These nuclei motivate and participate in the initiation of behavior directed at
maintaining the animal in optimal physiological condition (Damasio & Carvalho, 2013;
Swanson, 2000). The integrative structures of the basal ganglia and midbrain utilize the
information on the status and needs of the animal together with information on where the
animal is situated relative to available resources in order to prioritize resource seeking,
resolve competing needs, and select targets and actions (McHaffie et al., 2005; Merker,
2007; Gurney, Prescott, & Redgrave, 2001; Redgrave, Prescott, & Gurney, 1999).
Possible actions are set in competition, and the winner of the competition gains effective
control of action (Gurney et al., 2001; Merker, 2007; Redgrave et al., 1999). This in turn
feeds back into topographically oriented spatial information generated by the SC,
generating “task-relevance maps” (Navalpakkam, Arbib, & Itti, 2005) which further guide
active exploration of the environment. The motivational and physiological states of the
organism prioritize target and action selection, but the location and availability of targets
is also a key factor influencing what is targeted and what next action will be taken
(Merker, 2007).
The midbrain thus allows for unified sensory processing and decision making without
invoking a separate control system utilizing the information to make a decision (McHaffie
et al., 2005; Redgrave et al., 1999) or regressing to a “Cartesian Theatre” (Dennett, 1991).
Merker’s (2007) conceptual behavioral core control system emphasizes how domains
critical to decision making, target selection, action selection and motivation must interact
since the interactions are critical to effective decision making. Crucially, the midbrain
integrates particular types of information into a unified model. Thus it is not integration
per se that matters (as suggested, for example, by Tononi (2004, 2008; Tononi & Koch,
2015), but the dynamic and ongoing connection between perception, interoception,
associative memory, and motor feedback.
3. Parallels Between Vertebrate and Insect Brains
The functional parallels between the vertebrate midbrain and insect brains form the
centerpiece of our argument. While there is no obvious similarity in the gross anatomy
(Figure 2), there is an overall similarity in functional architecture between the vertebrate
midbrain and the insect brain as a whole. (A full presentation may be found in Barron &
Klein, 2016).
In the insect brain, the central complex (CX) is specialized for the processing of spatial
information and the organization of movement (Heinze & Homberg, 2007; Pfeiffer &
Homberg, 2014; Plath & Barron, 2015). The CX is functionally analogous to the SC in many
respects. The CX processes multiple sources of spatial information drawn from different
senses to locate the moving animal in space. This includes spatially structured
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information on plane-polarized light (Bockhorst & Homberg, 2015; Heinze & Homberg,
2007; Lin et al., 2013; Pfeiffer & Homberg, 2014); spatially structured visual information
on moving objects (Kathman, Kesavan, & Ritzmann, 2014; Rosner & Homberg, 2013;
Seelig & Jayaraman, 2013; Weir, Schnell, & Dickinson, 2014) corrected for self-motion to
resolve the re-afference problem (Seelig & Jayaraman, 2013); and spatially structured
mechanosensory and proprioceptive information in cockroaches (Guo & Ritzmann, 2013),
Drosophila (Seelig & Jayaraman, 2015), and crickets (Kai & Okada, 2013). Like the
mammalian SC, the insect CX is necessary for targeting, reaching, orientation, and directed
movement (Kai & Okada, 2013; Kathman et al., 2014; Pfeiffer & Homberg, 2014).
Processing within the CX enables the insect to maintain a course using either visual or
proprioceptive information (Seelig & Jayaraman, 2015).

Figure 2: Basic functional anatomy of the insect brain (not to scale). The
structures of the insect brain are functionally analogous to those functions of the
vertebrate midbrain described in Figure 1. (Regions are colored to highlight the
functional analogy with Figure 1A.) Sensory lobes, of the antennae (AL) and visual
system (lamina (LA), medulla (ME) and lobula (LO)) contribute information on
environment state and structure (Galizia, 2014; Horridge, 2005). The mushroom
bodies (MB) support learning and memory (Bazhenov et al., 2013; Heisenberg,
2003; Huerta, Nowotny, Garcia-Sanchez, Abarbanel, & Rabinovich, 2004; Menzel,
2001; Schwaerzel et al., 2003). The central complex (CX) is anatomically variable
between insect orders, but is typically composed of the central body upper (CBU),
central body lower (CBL), and noduli (NO). It is specialised for processing spatial
information (Kathman et al., 2014; Pfeiffer & Homberg, 2014; Pfeiffer & Crailsheim,
1998; Plath & Barron, 2015; Seelig & Jayaraman, 2015). The protocerebrum (P) is
large and anatomically complicated region, and connects these other regions. It is
premotor and serves as a final common path for all sensory information either
directly from the lobes, or via the MB and CX pathways. Modulatory and inhibitory
connections to and within the protocerebrum convey information on physiological
state (Galizia, 2014; Parnas et al., 2013). The region is involved in both integration
of information and processing of state of self, hence the hatched shading.
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The CX sends outputs to and receives inputs from protocerebral structures, particularly
the bulb and lateral accessory lobe (Pfeiffer & Homberg, 2014) (Figure 2). The
protocerebrum is composed of a number of interconnected subregions that are both
premotor and a point of convergence for outputs from the sensory lobes, the CX, and the
mushroom bodies (MB) (Ito et al., 2014; Strausfeld, 1976, 2012; Strausfeld & Hirth, 2013).
In the vertebrate midbrain and basal ganglia, there are several integrative loci that
support learning and memory so that the organism can update its responses to stimuli
according to its experience (Figure 1A). In insects, this capacity is supported by the MB
(Bazhenov, Huerta, & Smith, 2013; Fahrbach, 2006; Galizia, 2014). Connectivity between
the intrinsic neurons that make up the MB (Kenyon cells) and their inputs and outputs is
plastic, supporting experience-dependent changes in how stimuli are represented by the
population of neurons in the MB, and the downstream neurons that are activated or
inhibited (Barron, Gurney, Meah, Vasilaki, & Marshall, 2015; Galizia, 2014).
Within the protocerebrum, and connecting to the CX and MB, there are highly specialized
modulatory neuron clusters that modify neural activity according to the physiological and
motivational state of the insect (Andretic, van Swinderen, & Greenspan, 2005; Burke et
al., 2012; Krashes et al., 2009; Søvik, Perry, & Barron, 2015). These specialized circuits
modify how the insect responds to events according to its subjective internal state such
as arousal, sleep, satiation, hunger, and reward (Andretic et al., 2005; Burke et al., 2012;
Krashes et al., 2009; Liu, Liu, Kodama, Driscoll, & Wu, 2012; Søvik et al., 2015). This is
functionally parallel to the hypothalamic nuclei in vertebrates.
Competitive processing within the protocerebrum contributes to effective decision
making and action selection utilizing all available sensory information as well as
information on the state of the insect (Barron et al., 2015; Galizia, 2014; Liang et al., 2013;
Parnas, Lin, Huetteroth, & Miesenböck, 2013). Hence competitive processing within the
protocerebrum is functionally similar to the vertebrate basal ganglia system.
The insect classifies and weights environmental stimuli according to their relevance to
the insect (Strube-Bloss, Nawrot, & Menzel, 2011). In addition, insects selectively filter the
processing of sensory information to prioritize the stimuli of the greatest immediate
relevance and discount stimuli of no subjective relevance. This has been demonstrated for
both honey bees (Apis mellifera) and Drosophila (Paulk et al., 2014; Sareen, Wolf, &
Heisenberg, 2011; van Swinderen, 2005; van Swinderen & Greenspan, 2003) in which the
neural representation of the environment is both subjective and egocentric.
In summary, there are significant parallels between the functional organization of the
insect brain and that of the vertebrate midbrain behavioral core control system. Both
systems have specialized regions for processing the position of the moving animal in
space. In both systems action selection is resolved by combining information on position
with information on the environment, the relevance of stimuli in the environment to the
animal, and the state of the animal (Figures 1, 2). In vertebrates the channels of
information are sufficiently unified such that the system as a whole creates a functional
representation of the state of the mobile animal in space as a solution for effective decision
making.
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As we have argued, processing of this kind supports the capacity for a subjective
experience of the environment. Processing in the insect brain is unified to a similar degree,
for similar reasons. Hence we propose that the insect brain can also support a capacity for
subjective experience.
4. The Evolutionary Origins of Subjective Experience
We have argued that subjective experience arose as a consequence of the integrated
behavioral control systems for effective decision making and action selection. In both
vertebrate and insect lineages, the control systems we have described are highly
conserved and basal to the groups (Feinberg & Mallatt, 2016; Strausfeld, 2012). The early
evolution and high degree of conservation of these neural systems is understandable
given that they resolve fundamental problems for mobile animals. But if these unified
behavioral control systems are ancient, then it is possible that subjective experience itself
is similarly ancient.
The key structural elements of the vertebrate behavioral core control system are all
present and functional in lampreys (extant, primitive jawless fish) (Feinberg & Mallatt,
2013; Grillner, Robertson, & Stephenson-Jones, 2013; Merker, 2005; Stephenson-Jones,
Samuelsson, Ericsson, Robertson, & Grillner, 2011; I. C. Zompa & Dubuc, 1996; Iolanda C.
Zompa & Dubuc, 1998). These structures are present in the basal vertebrates and
conserved across all extant groups. It has also been proposed that similar structures might
have been present in the fossil vertebrate Haikouichthys from the Cambrian (Feinberg &
Mallatt, 2013; Feinberg & Mallatt, 2016). Haikouichthys is reconstructed as a fish-like
active swimmer with large image-forming eyes (Shu et al., 2003). If so, then subjective
experience in vertebrates is at least as old as the Cambrian (Feinberg & Mallatt, 2013;
Feinberg & Mallatt, 2016).
The insect behavioral core control system has similarly ancient origins. The CX is basal to
insects. It almost certainly predates the divergence of insects, crustaceans and arachnids
since homologous structures are found in all three groups (Homberg, 2008; Loesel,
Nässel, & Strausfeld, 2002; Pfeiffer & Homberg, 2014). Some Cambrian arthropods had
well-developed cephalic ganglia with structural similarities to extant crustacean and
insect brains (Ma, Hou, Edgecombe, & Strausfeld, 2012). It is reasonable to suppose that a
version of the extant insect behavioral core control system was present in at least some
Cambrian arthropods to support their presumed active foraging and hunting lifestyles
(Trestman, 2013).
It is presently unclear whether the insect and vertebrate behavioral core control systems
evolved independently. Strausfeld and Hirth (2013) have argued for a deep homology
between the insect CX and associated structures and vertebrate basal ganglia. If this
interpretation is correct, it would imply that a form of behavioral core control system may
even predate the divergence of these groups.
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5. Defending the Insect Brain
Our argument depends on functional claims about the insect brain. Much of this is recent
science. Insect brains have been consistently underestimated, and it is worth addressing
some of those misunderstandings.
Some have denied that insects have the requisite functional organization for subjective
experience. This includes Merker himself, (2007), who cites Altman’s (1989)
characterization of the insect brain as a decentralized system with the cephalic ganglion
a locus for sensory input but with action selection resolved locally at the motor systems
of the segmental ganglia. Altman’s (1989) view of the insect nervous system was itself
inspired by Brooks’s (1989) subsumption architectures for behavioral control of a
walking robot.
This view of the insect brain is outdated. The cephalic ganglion clearly executes a
command function over the behavioral system since reasonably small and
neurochemically specific lesions of the protocerebrum proximal to the CX can completely
incapacitate an insect by removing volitional behavioral control (Libersat & Gal, 2014).
Others have focused not on organization but on neuron number. The gulf between the size
of insect and mammalian brains is indeed enormous. The honey bee has less than a million
neurons in the cephalic ganglion – and this is a very large brain for an insect. By
comparison, a mouse (Mus musculus) has 68 million neurons in the brain, a rhesus
monkey (Macaca mullata) 6.4 billion and a human 86 billion (Herculano-Houzel, 2016).
Many writers on insects have thus focused on the limitations imposed by their
comparatively tiny brains. Feinberg and Mallatt (2013) have argued that most of the
vertebrates have a capacity for subjective experience. Yet they are equivocal on whether
insects have the capacity, precisely because of neuron number (Feinberg & Mallatt, 2016).
We believe it is inappropriate to focus on neuron number alone. Functional organization
is what matters. Neuron number is important only insofar as it might affect functional
organization. Insect brains are small, but they have enough neurons to do the job, and that
is all that matters.
Insect brains are also extremely economical in their use of neurons. While higher
vertebrates have large neural loci for processing internal states and motivations, insects
perform analogous functions with clusters of just a few neurons (Andretic et al., 2005;
Burke et al., 2012; Krashes et al., 2009; Søvik et al., 2015). The human nucleus accumbens
(part of the reward system of the vertebrate brain) is larger than the whole honey bee
brain, but honey bees organize analogous reinforcing functions of the nucleus accumbens
with clusters of just a few broad-field neuromodulatory neurons (Perry & Barron, 2013;
Søvik et al., 2015).
The larger vertebrate brains are very likely more robust, degenerate, and precise, and
have greater capacities for storage and parallel processing than the small and economical
insect brains (Chittka & Niven, 2009). But we agree with Chittka and Niven (2009) that
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the qualitative differences in processing capacity of brains at the insect and vertebrate
scales are not as great as they might seem given the differences in neuron number.
6. Why There Is a Lower Bound
Finally, some have postulated subjective experience in insects because they think that
consciousness is even more widespread. For example, authors have postulated subjective
experience in plants (Pelizzon & Gagliano, 2015), in any reasonably complex system (see
Tononi, 2004), or even that it is a fundamental feature of the universe akin to spin and
electric charge (Strawson, 2006). Such views would obviously imply that insects are
conscious (though that is far from their most striking prediction).
We disagree. We think there is a cutoff. Many animals, all plants, and (as far as we know)
all currently existing man-made artifacts fall below the line. Without the right kind of
centralized integration and modeling, an organism cannot be conscious.
Box jellyfish, for example, are highly mobile and use well-developed lensed eyes and
chemosensors to actively hunt prey (Garm, Oskarsson, & Nilsson, 2011; Kingsford &
Mooney, 2014). Yet they (like all Cnidarians) have a decentralized nervous system, and a
completely decentralized behavioral control system. Sense organs independently
modulate activity in local regions of the sensory net and muscle walls to steer the animal
(Petie, Garm, & Nilsson, 2011).
While centralized processing of all available exteroceptive and interoceptive sensory
information is necessary for subjective experience, centralization alone is not sufficient.
What is processed, and how it is processed, also matters. This requirement may itself
seem churlish. Having gone so far, why deny conscious experience to (say) worms?
We think the answer is instructive. Consider the nematode Caenorhabditis elegans. The
nervous system of the nematode is centralized, and famously well characterized. It
includes thermo-, mechano-, chemo-, and nociceptors, and interoceptive senses related to
physiological state (Gordus, Pokala, Levy, Flavell, & Bargmann, 2015) and the passing of
time (de Bono & Maricq, 2005). These are integrated at the level of an array of
interneurons that activate motor neurons (de Bono & Maricq, 2005; Kato et al., 2015).
Nematodes are thus able to integrate multiple forms of sensory input using a centralized
nervous system. Action selection in nematodes is driven by shifts in global brain dynamics
(Kato et al., 2015).
Nematodes can learn, and hence can change how they react to stimuli (Gordus et al.,
2015). They also have basic memory and can retain learned behavioral changes (Ardiel &
Rankin, 2010). But nematodes have no spatial senses. They have no capacity to locate
themselves in their environment or to detect the relative position of objects around them.
This has significant consequences. Because there are no spatial dimensions to a
nematode’s sensory world, the only way nematodes can interrelate sensory information
is by contiguity. This is supported by their neural network and basic forms of learning and
memory (Ardiel & Rankin, 2010; Gordus et al., 2015).
Nematodes cannot perform the integrated spatiotemporal modeling that characterizes
the vertebrate midbrain and the insect brain. All nematode behavior is a direct reaction
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to their immediate state. There is no evidence of planning in nematodes, nor structured
search behavior. Hungry nematodes respond to starvation with increased locomotion and
dispersal in a random rather than directed search (Artyukhin, Yim, Cheong, & Avery,
2015; Lü ersen, Faust, Gottschling, & Döring, 2014).
That immediate reactivity is in sharp contrast to the behavior of hungry rodents, ants, and
bees, who will navigate to places where they have previously encountered food when
hungry (Oades & Isaacson, 1978; Seeley, 1995; Wehner, 2013). Hence, in mammals and
insects, homeostatic drives direct behavior to where resources are expected to be, even if
they are not currently there. Such anticipatory behavior is not possible for nematodes,
who have no capacity to form any spatial relations between arbitrary objects.
The final point is important. The key feature of the integrated core control system is that
it allows the interaction of diverse and novel elements in a single process. That is what
makes sensation and action integrated. That is why the basic capacity for subjective
experience can be extended to include ever more complicated contents as brains expand.
It allows organisms to extract synthetic interrelations between elements. And of course
that is what allows the organism to represent itself and its place within a broader
representation of the world.
We have emphasized the importance of mechanisms that support integrated modeling of
the environment. The sense of “modeling” we have in mind is a relatively lightweight one.
It is important to note that it does not require the construction of offline, non-dynamic
representations. Models can be constructed dynamically rather than stored statically. The
important thing for our purposes is the process of integration rather than static
representation. Our view is thus compatible with (for example) Barbara Webb’s (2004,
2006) critiques of representationalist thinking in insect neuroscience.
That said, we believe that this integrative process is representational in a straightforward
sense. We have little interest in arguing about the terms “representation” and “model.”
The important fact for present purposes is that organisms like nematodes lack any such
ability. As a consequence, a nematode cannot locate itself in space, nor position itself
relative to things around it, nor relate itself to its own distant past, nor relate its current
needs in arbitrary ways to any of this in order to give them meaning and context. The
nematode nervous system just transforms the immediate sensory environment into
immediate motor responses. Of course, for the simple environments that nematodes are
bound to, and for the simple responses they can enact, this form of behavioral control
system is more than sufficient. But we do not believe that with almost no capacity to
interrelate sensory information the nematode nervous system supports a capacity for
subjective experience.
7. Conclusion: Making Progress on Hard Problems
We have emphasized throughout the importance of a mobile lifestyle in driving the
evolution of consciousness. The importance of mobility for driving neural evolution is not
a new idea, but it is worth emphasizing. Mobility presented a fundamentally new sort of
challenge to organisms, one that modern AI still finds extremely difficult (Brooks, 1999).
As Moravec puts it (1984),
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I conclude that a mobile way of life favors general solutions that tend
towards intelligence, while non-motion favors deep specializations. A fixed
organism is repeatedly exposed to a limited set of problems and
opportunities, and will do better in the long run if it becomes good at
dealing with this limited range. A roving creature encounters fewer
instances of a greater variety of different conditions, and does better with
general methods, even if such generality is more expensive, or results in
poorer performance in specific instances.
The cumulative effect of this difference in selection pressure is enormous,
as evidenced by clams and octopus, or plants and animals. Trees are as
successful and dominant in their niche as humans are in theirs, but the life
of a tree does not demand high speed general purpose perception, flexible
planning and precisely controlled action.
Centralization in the service of action selection is, we have argued, the advance that
allowed for the evolution of subjective experience.
Of course, we might be wrong. Many reject Merker’s theory, or even the basic premise that
the midbrain is key to subjective experience. Alternatives to Merker might fail to
generalize to invertebrates. We have emphasized the importance of a unified perspective
on the world as a key feature of subjective experience (Christoff et al., 2011). We might
have left out other neural features that are necessary for subjective experience, such as
an explicit representation of a temporal dimension (Kant, 1999). Insects may lack these
(though see Skorupski & Chittka, 2006).
That said, we emphasize that disagreement of this sort should ultimately rest on empirical
facts: that is, on structural, functional, and comparative hypotheses about brains. In that
sense, our position is a thoroughly naturalistic one. We have not attempted to say
anything about the hard problem of consciousness (Chalmers, 1996). Instead, we follow
the advice of Penfield & Rasmussen (1950) to the effect that:
...neurologists should push their investigations into the neurologic
mechanism associated with consciousness and should inquire closely into
the localization of that mechanism without apology and without
undertaking responsibility for the theory of consciousness (Penfield &
Rasmussen, 1950).
We think that a contemporary study of consciousness resembles the study of vital forces
before modern physiology (Cruse & Schilling, 2015). What seemed like a great gap
between the organic and the inorganic was ultimately bridged by the development of
appropriate scientific concepts.
We have a similar take on the hard problem: It is difficult because we don’t yet have the
concepts for assessing what a satisfying answer could even look like. The solution,
however, is to press on as best we can with empirical inquiry, revising our concepts as we
go. We have offered an ostensive definition of the phenomenon we care about and we
have given a mechanistic story about how that phenomenon is realized. The search for
mechanisms does not require anything like a clear concept at the outset (Craver, 2007).
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Rather, a search for mechanisms can be the means of clarifying our concepts (Wimsatt,
2007) and thereby moving past seemingly intractable difficulties. We hope that this will
also turn out to be the case for the study of consciousness. Insects, and invertebrates more
generally, have often been overlooked as potential players in this story. We hope to
correct that oversight.
Acknowledgments
In addition to those thanked in Barron & Klein (2016), thanks to Bruno van Swinderen and attendees at the
2016 SydPP meeting for additional feedback. Figures 1 and 2 were created by Marcus J.A. Plath. This work
was supported by Australian Research Council Future Fellowship project no. FT140100452 awarded to
A.B.B. and Australian Research Council Future Fellowship project no. FT140100422 awarded to C.K.
Call for Commentary: Animal Sentience publishes Open Peer Commentary on all accepted target
articles. Target articles are peer-reviewed. Commentaries are editorially reviewed. There are
submitted commentaries as well as invited commentaries. Commentaries appear as soon as they
have been revised and accepted. Target article authors may respond to their commentaries
individually or in a joint response to multiple commentaries.
Instructions: http://animalstudiesrepository.org/animsent/guidelines.html

References
Alkire, M. T., Hudetz, A. G., & Tononi, G. (2008). Consciousness and anesthesia. Science,
322(5903), 876-880.
Altman, J. S., & Kien, J. (1989). New models for motor control. Neural Computation, 1, 173183.
Andretic, R., van Swinderen, B., & Greenspan, R. J. (2005). Dopaminergic modulation of
arousal in Drosophila. Current Biology, 15, 1165-1175.
Ardiel, E. L., & Rankin, C. H. (2010). An elegant mind: Learning and memory in
Caenorhabditis elegans. Learning and Memory, 17, 191-201.
Artyukhin, A. B., Yim, J. J., Cheong, M. C., & Avery, L. (2015). Starvation-induced collective
behavior in C. elegans. Scientific Reports, 5, 10647. doi: 10.1038/srep10647
Barron, A. B., & Klein, C. (2016). What insects can tell us about the origins of consciousness.
Proceedings of the National Academy of Science of the United States of America, 113(18),
4900-4908.
Barron, A. B., Gurney, K. N., Meah, L. F. S., Vasilaki, E., & Marshall, J. A. R. (2015). Decisionmaking and action selection in insects: inspiration from vertebrate-based theories.
Frontiers in Behavioral Neuroscience, 9, 216. doi: 10.3389/fnbeh.2015.00216
Bayne, T., Hohwy, J., & Owen, A. M. (2016). Are there levels of consciousness? Trends in
Cognitive Sciences, 20(6), 405-413.
Bazhenov, M., Huerta, R., & Smith, B. (2013). A computational framework for understanding
decision making through integration of basic learning rules. Journal of Neuroscience,
33(13), 5686-5697.
Block, N. (1995). On a confusion about a function of consciousness. Behavioral and Brain
Sciences, 18(02), 227-287.
Bockhorst, T., & Homberg, U. (2015). Amplitude and dynamics of polarization-plane
signaling in the central complex of the locust brain. Journal of Neurophysiology, 113,
3291–3311.

13

Animal Sentience 2016.100: Klein & Barron on Insect Experience
Brooks, R. A. (1989). A robot that walks; Emergent behaviors from a carefully evolved
network. Neural Computation, 1, 253-262.
Brooks, R. A. (1999). Cambrian intelligence: The early history of the new AI. Cambridge, MA:
MIT Press.
Burke, C. J., Huetteroth, W., Owald, D., Perisse, E., Krashes, M. J., Das, G., Gohl, D., Silies, M.,
Certel, S., & Waddell, S. (2012). Layered reward signalling through octopamine and
dopamine in Drosophila. Nature, 492(7429), 433-437. doi: 10.1038/nature11614
Chalmers, D. (1996). The conscious mind: In search of a fundamental theory. New York:
Oxford University Press.
Chittka, L., & Niven, J. (2009). Are bigger brains better? Current Biology, 19, R995-R1008.
Christoff, K., Cosmelli, D., Legrand, D., & Thompson, E. (2011). Specifying the self for
cognitive neuroscience. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 15(3), 104-112.
Craver, C. F. (2007). Explaining the brain. New York: Oxford University Press.
Cruse, H., & Schilling, M. (2015). Mental states as emergent properties: from walking to
consciousness. Open MIND, 9, 1-38.
Damasio, A. (1999). The feeling of what happens: Body and emotion in the making of
consciousness. Orlando: Harcourt Inc.
Damasio, A., & Carvalho, G. B. (2013). The nature of feelings: evolutionary and
neurobiological origins. Nature Reviews Neuroscience, 14, 143-152.
Damasio, A., & Van Hoesen, G. (1983). Emotional disturbances associated with focal lesions
of the limbic frontal lobe. In P. Satz & K. M. Heilman (Eds.), Neuropsychology of Human
Emotion (pp. 85-110). New York: Guilford Press
Damasio, A., Damasio, H., & Tranel, D. (2012). Persistence of feelings and sentience after
bilateral damage of the insula. Cerebral Cortex, 23(4), 833-846.
De Bono, M., & Maricq, A. V. (2005). Neuronal substrates of complex behaviors in C. elegans.
Annual Review of Neuroscience, 28, 451-501.
Dennett, D. C. (1991). Consciousness explained. Boston: Little, Brown, & co.
Edelman, G. M. (2003). Naturalizing consciousness: a theoretical framework. Proceedings of
the National Academy of Sciences, 100(9), 5520-5524.
Fahrbach, S. E. (2006). Structure of the mushroom bodies of the insect brain. Annual Review
of Entomology, 51, 209-232.
Feinberg, T. E., & Mallatt, J. (2013). The evolutionary and genetic origins of consciousness in
the Cambrian Period over 500 million years ago. Frontiers in Psychology, 4(667), 1-27.
Feinberg, T. E., & Mallatt, J. M. (2016). The ancient origins of consciousness: How the brain
created experience. Cambrige, MA: MIT Press.
Frens, M. A., Suzuki, Y., Scherberger, H., Hepp, K., & Henn, V. (1998). The collicular code of
saccade direction depends on the roll orientation of the head relative to gravity.
Experimental Brain Research, 120, 283-290.
Friedman-Hill, S., Robertson, L. C., & Treisman, A. (1995). Parietal contributions to visual
feature binding: evidence from a patient with bilateral lesions. Science, 269(5225), 853855.
Galizia, C. G. (2014). Olfactory coding in the insect brain: data and conjectures. European
Journal of Neuroscience, 39, 1784-1795.
Garm, A., Oskarsson, M., & Nilsson, D.-E. (2011). Box jellyfish use terrestrial visual cues for
navigation. Current Biology, 21, 798–803.
Gili, T., Saxena, N., Diukova, A., Murphy, K., Hall, J. E., & Wise, R. G. (2013). The thalamus and
brainstem act as key hubs in alterations of human brain network connectivity induced
by mild propofol sedation. The Journal of Neuroscience, 33(9), 4024-4031. Gordus, A.,
Pokala, N., Levy, S., Flavell, S. W., & Bargmann, C. L. (2015). Feedback from network
states generates variability in a probabilistic olfactory circuit. Cell, 161, 215-227.

14

Animal Sentience 2016.100: Klein & Barron on Insect Experience
Grillner, S., Robertson, B., & Stephenson-Jones, M. (2013). The evolutionary origin of the
vertebrate basal ganglia and its role in action selection. Journal of Physiology, 591(22),
5425-5431.
Groh, J. M., & Sparks, D. L. (1996). Saccades to somatosensory targets. III. Eye-dependent
somatosensory activity in primate superior colliculus. Journal of Neurophysiology, 75,
439-453.
Guo, P., & Ritzmann, R. (2013). Neural activity in the central complex of the cockroach brain
is linked to turning behaviors. Journal of Experimental Biology, 216, 992-1002. Gurney, K.
N., Prescott, T. J., & Redgrave, P. (2001). A computational model of action selection in the
basal ganglia I: A new functional anatomy. Biological Cybernetics, 84, 401-410.
Harting, J. K., Updyke, B. V., & Van Lieshout, D. P. (1992). Corticotectal projections in the cat:
Anterograde transport studies of twenty-five cortical areas. Journal of Comparative
Neurology, 328, 379-414.
Heinze, S., & Homberg, U. (2007). Maplike representation of celestial E-vector orientations in
the brain of an insect. Science, 315, 995-997.
Heisenberg, M. (2003). Mushroom body memoir: from maps to models. Nature Reviews
Neuroscience, 4, 266-275.
Herbet, G., Lafargue, G., de Champfleur, N. M., Moritz-Gasser, S., le Bars, E., Bonnetblanc, F. C.,
& Duffau, H. (2014). Disrupting posterior cingulate connectivity disconnects
consciousness from the external environment. Neuropsychologia, 56, 239-244.
Herculano-Houzel, S. (2016). The human advantage: a new understanding of how our
brain became remarkable. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Homberg, U. (2008). Evolution of the central complex in the arthropod brain with respect to
the visual system. Arthropod Structure and Development, 37, 347-362. Horowitz, G. D., &
Newsome, W. T. (1999). Separate signals for target selection and movement specification
in the superior colliculus. Science, 284, 1158-1161.
Horridge, A. (2005). What the honeybee sees: a review of the recognition system of Apis
mellifera. Physiological Entomology, 30, 2-13.
Huerta, R., Nowotny, T., Garcia-Sanchez, M., Abarbanel, H. D. L., & Rabinovich, M. I. (2004).
learning classification in the olfactory system of insects. Neural Computation, 16, 16011640.
Ito, K., Shinomiya, K., Ito, M., Armstrong, J. D., Boyan, G., Hartenstein, V., Harzsch, S.,
Heisenberg, M., Homberg, U., Jenett, A., Keshishian, H., Restifo, L. L., Rössler, W., Simpson,
J. H., Strausfeld, N. J., Strauss, R., & Vosshall, L. B. (2014). A systematic nomenclature for
the insect brain. Neuron, 81(4), 755-765. doi: 10.1016/j.neuron.2013.12.017
Jékely, G., Keijzer, F., & Godfrey-Smith, P. (2015). An option space for early neural evolution.
Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B, 370(1684). doi:
10.1098/rstb.2015.0181
Kai, K., & Okada, R. (2013). Characterization of locomotor-related spike activity in
protocerebrum of freely walking cricket. Zoological Science, 30, 591-601.
Kant, I. (1999). Critique of pure reason: The cambridge edition of the works of Immanuel Kant
(P. Guyer & A. W. Wood, Eds.). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Kapur, N., Ellison, D., Parkin, A. J., Hunkin, N. M., Burrows, E., Sampson, S., & Morrison, E.
(1994). Bilateral temporal lobe pathology with sparing of medial temporal lobe
structures: Lesion profile and pattern of memory disorder. Neuropsychologia, 32(1), 2338.
Kathman, N., Kesavan, M., & Ritzmann, R. (2014). Encoding wide-field motion and direction
in the central complex of the cockroach Blaberus discoidalis. Journal of Experimental
Biology, 217, 4079-4090.

15

Animal Sentience 2016.100: Klein & Barron on Insect Experience
Kato, S., Kaplan, H. S., Schrödel, T., Skora, S., Lindsay, T. H., Yemini, E., Lockery, S., & Zimmer,
M. (2015). Global brain dynamics embed the motor command sequence of
Caenorhabditis elegans. Cell, 163, 1-14.
Kingsford, M. J., & Mooney, C. J. (2014). The ecology of box jellyfishes (Cubozoa). In K. A. Pitt
& C. H. Lucas (Eds.), Jellyfish blooms (pp. 267-303). New York: Springer
Klier, E. M., Wang, H., & Crawford, J. D. (2001). The superior colliculus encodes gaze
commands in retinal coordinates. Nature Neuroscience, 4, 627-632.
Knox, P. C., & Donaldson, I. M. L. (1995). The effect of afferent signals from extraocular
muscles on visual responses of cells in the optic tectum of the pigeon. Proceedings of the
Royal Society of London, Series B, Biological Sciences, 259, 285–291.
Krashes, M. J., DasGupta, S., Vreede, A., White, B., Armstrong, J. D., & Waddell, S. (2009). A
neural circuit mechanism integrating motivational state with memory expression in
Drosophila. Cell, 139, 416-427.
Krauzlis, R. J., Liston, D., & Carello, C. D. (2004). Target selection and the superior colliculus:
goals, choices and hypotheses. Vision Research, 44, 1445-1451.
Långsjö, J. W., Alkire, M. T., Kaskinoro, K., Hayama, H., Maksimow, A., Kaisti, K. K., Aalto, S.,
Aantaa, R., Jääskeläinen, S. K., Revonsuo, A., & Scheinin, H. (2012). Returning from
oblivion: imaging the neural core of consciousness. The Journal of Neuroscience, 32(14),
4935-4943.
Liang, L., Li, Y., Potter, C. J., Yizhar, O., Deisseroth, K., Tsien, R. W., & Luo, L. (2013). GABAergic
projection neurons route selective olfactory inputs to specific higher-order neurons.
Neuron, 79, 917-931.
Libersat, F., & Gal, R. (2014). Wasp voodoo rituals, venom-cocktails, and the zombification of
cockroach hosts. Integrative and Comparative Biology, 54(2), 129-142.
Lin, C., Chuang, C. C., Hua, T., Chen, C. C., Dickson, B. J., Greenspan, R. J., & Chiang, A. S. (2013).
A comprehensive wiring diagram of the protocerebral bridge for visual information
processing in the Drosophila brain. Cell Reports, 3, 1739-1753.
Liu, Q., Liu, S., Kodama, L., Driscoll, M. R., & Wu, M. N. (2012). Two dopaminergic neurons
signal to the dorsal fan-shaped body to promote wakefulness in Drosophila. Current
Biology, 22(22), R949-R951.
Loesel, R., Nässel, D., & Strausfeld, N. (2002). Common design in a unique midline neuropil in
the brains of arthropods. Arthropod Structure & Development, 31(1), 77-91.
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“Qualia” are the subjective or phenomenal (conscious) experiences associated with the
perception of olfactory, taste, visual, auditory, and somatosensory stimuli. Qualia are
often described as the “what it feels like” when we perceive our environment (Nagel,
1974; Kanai and Tsuchiya, 2012). The salient element of a quale is that the experience is
conscious, and it is hence dependent on conscious neural processing (Rolls, 2007; Keller,
2014). The distinction between conscious and non-conscious processing of stimuli is
clearly recognised in the case of pain. The non-conscious neural processing of noxious
stimuli (i.e., those stimuli that cause or have the potential to cause body tissue damage) is
referred to as nociception. The resultant motor behaviours (such as the flexion
withdrawal reflex; e.g., withdrawing a hand from a hot stove) are called nocifensive
behaviours and are executed non-consciously. The feeling of pain in humans may
subsequently emerge at longer latency, since it involves supraspinal neural pathways
leading to evoked cerebral potentials (Garcia-Larrea et al., 1993; Bromm and Lorenz,
1998) that are associated with conscious neural processing (Boly et al., 2011; Changeux,
2012; Constant and Sabourdin, 2015).
Not all noxious stimuli necessarily cause pain. For instance, activation of inhibitory
neural circuitry can prevent the subsequent conscious processing of noxious stimuli
(Millan, 2002), or alternatively an individual may have damaged neural circuitry that
prevents the conscious processing of such signals. Moreover, some vertebrates, such as
fish, may lack the neural machinery or architecture to consciously experience (i.e., to feel)
noxious stimuli as painful (Key, 2015a). The possibility that fish lack the necessary neural
“hardware” to feel pain is typically overlooked because of anthropomorphic tendencies
that bias interpretations of behavioural observations (Horowitz and Bekoff, 2007). Given
this controversy, an alternate view is emerging. The proposition is that it is impossible to
ever know what a fish feels, and as a consequence fish should be given the “benefit of the
doubt” and unconditionally bestowed with the ability to feel pain.
The argument that no one can ever know what a fish feels because they can never
be a fish is similar to issues raised in Nagel’s (1974) classic philosophical essay regarding
what it feels like to be a bat. While on one hand it is easy to accept that we can never be a
fish, on the other hand we vicariously experience the pain of our friends and family
members without ever really knowing what they actually feel (Meyer et al., 2012). We
most likely do this because we intuitively understand that humans share similar
functioning nervous systems and behaviours and therefore will experience similar
feelings. Although we will never be fish, I contend that we can strongly defend the thesis
that fish do not feel pain based on inferences derived, in this case, from experimental
evidence from neuroscience and evolutionary biology investigations on humans and
nonhuman animals. Similar strategies are adopted extensively in biological research.
They have been particularly successful in better understanding, for example, the
evolution of feathers and flight from dinosaurs to birds (Xu et al., 2014), the role of gene
regulatory pathways in animal body plans (Davidson and Erwin, 2006) and the
underlying conservation of neural circuitry controlling locomotor behaviour throughout
vertebrate phylogeny (Goulding, 2009).
The idea that it is more benevolent to assume that fish feel pain, rather than not
feel pain, has emerged as one position of compromise in the debate on fish consciousness.
However, accepting such an assumption at “face value” in biology can lead to devastating
consequences. I would like to highlight this concept using the recent example of how a
scientific research article was published that purportedly linked measles-mumps-rubella
(MMR) vaccination causally to autism. Although this link was subsequently disproven,
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many people continued to accept at “face value” the causal association between MMR
vaccination and the development of autism in children (Brown et al., 2012). This caused
parents not to have their children vaccinated, and it subsequently led to a public health
crisis (Flaherty, 2011). Thus, while initially accepting the idea that MMR vaccination
causes autism may be considered a safe way to proceed (even if it is not true), it can cause
catastrophic effects.
Accepting at “face value” that fish feel pain may seem like a harmless alternative,
but it has led to inappropriate approaches to fish welfare (Arlinghaus et al., 2007; Diggles
et al., 2011). It could also lead to legislative restrictions on fish-related activities with
potentially serious negative implications for native subsistence fishing (Capistrano and
Charles, 2012), human nutrition and food supply (Tacon and Metian, 2013), and economic
development (Tveteras et al., 2012). It should be noted that the “benefit of the doubt”
argument can quickly lead to unsupported anthropomorphic conclusions, such as
believing fish either feel happy being in company of other fish, or they feel disappointed
when they fail to capture prey.
While there is no convincing scientific evidence for the ability of fish to feel pain
(Key, 2015a; Rose et al., 2014), absence of evidence for pain does not mean evidence of
absence of pain. (I will return to this issue again.) Therefore, I will present some of the
reasoning, based on neuroscience and evolutionary biology principles, for why it is highly
improbable that fish feel pain. I will frame my argument around three basics questions
associated with the where, what and why of pain. That is, where does pain arise in the
nervous system, what is the cellular architecture associated with the where of pain, and
finally why do the where and what give rise to pain. Once I have outlined these three
fundamental premises, I will argue that fish lack the necessary neuroanatomical
structures or neural circuits to perform neural processing necessary for feeling pain.
Defining the Fundamental Premises of the Argument
Pain is in the brain. The premise that pain is generated by neural processing in the brain
is important for appreciating that select neural architectures (i.e., arrangements of pools
or clusters of neurons) and circuits (connections between these clusters) are necessary
to feel pain. When a noxious stimulus is applied to the toes, it may seem like the resultant
pain is localised in these appendages, however, the feeling of pain is actually generated in
the brain. One line of evidence supporting this conclusion comes from paraplegic
individuals with a complete spinal cord lesion. Such a lesion prevents the relay of neural
information from the toes to the brain. These people no longer feel pain or any sensation
applied to the body below the level of their lesions.
Whereas it may seem straightforward that the isolated spinal cord or any other
similar neural tissue that generates simple reflexes is unlikely to feel pain, problems begin
to emerge when we try to distinguish between simple reflexes (knee-jerk reflex),
integrated reflexes (e.g., crossed extension reflex; Sherrington, 1910) and more complex
movements such as scratching and locomotion that involve reconfiguration of reflex
circuitry into local patterns generators (Frigon, 2012). For example, a spinal-lesioned dog
(a dog with a spinal cord injury that severs passage of neural signals between the spinal
cord and brain, which is similar to the condition of paraplegia in humans) will attempt to
scratch a piece of paper soaked in an irritant (acetic acid) from its body. This behaviour
involves a complex coordination of hip, knee and ankle joint movements that are not
stereotyped since joint kinematics vary as the paper is shifted to different parts of the
body. Furthermore, a spinal-lesioned rat or mouse is able to learn to position its limb
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above a dish of water in order to prevent delivery of an electric shock when the limb
touches the water (Crown et al., 2002; Jindrich et al., 2009; Grau, 2014).
One interpretation of these behaviours is that the spinal cord (independently of
the brain) is able to feel the shock of the electric current and hence the animal is motivated
to move its limb into a position that prevents it from being shocked. However, we know
from human experience that there are no sensations in the body below the level of the
spinal cord lesion. The reason the spinal cord and its connections to skin and muscle elicit
such motor behaviours (referred to as nocifensive behaviours) is because it has evolved
over hundreds of millions of years to facilitate survival of the organism, and not because
it has feelings or possesses any inner motivation to act. Consequently, using nocifensive
behaviours as evidence of feeling of pain is fraught with problems of misinterpretation.
In order to begin to address whether fish can feel pain, I propose that it is necessary
to first understand the neural basis of pain in humans, since it is the only species able to
directly report on its feelings. The strategy adopted here involves three steps: (1) identify
which brain region is directly responsible for the feeling of pain in humans; (2) define the
neuroanatomical features of this region that allow the neural processing that generates
felt pain; and (3) assess whether fish have similar structural features that can then be used
to make inferences about whether fish can, or cannot, feel pain. Although this approach is
straightforward, the literature involving human pain, conscious neural processing, and
structure-function relationships across phylogeny is plagued by dogmatic preconceptions
and conceptual misunderstandings. Consequently, what may appear sensible to some, will
arouse claims of bias from others. Nonetheless, I have attempted to initially provide a
comprehensive overview of the origins of human pain in the brain. In doing so, I hope to
dispel some misunderstandings that commonly emerge in the literature about pain in fish
because of perfunctory attention to the neuroscience of pain.
There is compelling evidence that pain in humans is generated by neural activity
in the cerebral cortex, a thin, multi-layered plate of neuronal cell bodies and synaptic
connections that folds on itself to form sulci (furrows) and gyri (ridges) as it forms the
surface of the anterior brain. The cortex is anatomically defined by a number of distinct
lobes (e.g., frontal, occipital, temporal, insular and parietal), and each of these lobes is
further subdivided on the basis of anatomical cytoarchitecture and functional properties.
While subcortical structures (e.g., basal ganglia, ventral telencephalic nuclei, thalamus,
midbrain and hindbrain) contribute to the processing of noxious stimuli and to
nocifensive behaviours, the feeling of pain arises in the cortex. There are at least three
principal lines of evidence supporting the cortical origins of human pain: (1) brain
imaging reveals a dynamic network of cortical activity that provides a neural signature of
pain; (2) lesions to cortical regions in this network perturb pain; and (3) direct
stimulation of cortical regions in this network evoke pain.
Core network of cortical activity during pain. There is a dynamic core of cortical
regions (including prefrontal cortex, anterior cingulate cortex, somatosensory areas I [SI]
and II [SII], and the insular cortex) that consistently becomes active during the experience
of pain in humans (Schnitzler and Ploner, 2000; Tracey and Mantyh, 2007; Moayedi, 2014;
Mano and Seymour, 2015). This neural signature, as determined by functional magnetic
resonance imaging, is sufficiently accurate that it can be captured in an algorthm and used
to predict whether a human subject is experiencing pain (Wager et al., 2013; Rosa and
Seymour, 2014). None of the cortical subregions in this neural signature are selectively
active only during pain (Iannetti and Mouraux, 2010), but rather it is the overall dynamic
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and fluid activity of the network that defines the subjective experience (Garcia-Larrea and
Peyron, 2013; Kucyi and Davis, 2015).
Segerdahl et al. (2015) have recently used arterial spin-labelling quantitative
perfusion imaging to quantify cortical neural activity. They demonstrated a specific role
of the dorsal-posterior insular cortex in pain sensation. The subjective intensity of pain
correlated positively only with neural activity in this cortical region. The insular cortex is
grossly partitioned into anterior, middle and posterior divisions, and each of these regions
is selectively interconnected as well as connected with other brain regions associated
with the dynamic pain network (Weich et al., 2014). Together, these results suggest that
the insular cortex plays an important integrative function in the neural processing
associated with the sensation of pain and other salient stimuli (Uddin, 2015).
Typically there is no simple relationship between the evoked potential amplitude
recorded by electroencephalography in cortical regions and either the intensity of the
pain stimulus or the magnitude of the pain sensation (Iannetti et al., 2008). Instead, the
strength of high frequency gamma oscillations within SI correlates positively with both
the intensity of the stimulus (Rossiter et al., 2013) and the intensity of the pain
(independent of the salience of the stimulus) (Zhang et al., 2012). These observations have
led some authors who initially challenged the idea of a cortical signature of pain (Mouraux
et al., 2011) to now embrace the idea that gamma oscillations in discrete cortical regions
encode pain (Zhang et al., 2012). The putative role of gamma oscillations in pain is exciting
given that local cortical synchrony (Gray et al., 1989; Gross et al., 2007; Tiemann et al.,
2010), and long-range synchrony or binding of gamma oscillations, have been
consistently proposed to underlie pain and other feelings (Gray and Singer, 1989; Engel
et al., 1991; Engel and Singer, 2001; Salinas and Sejnowski, 2001; Fries et al., 2007; Hauck
et al., 2007; Gregoriou et al., 2009; Fries, 2009; Hauck et al., 2009; Ploner et al., 2009; Hipp
et al., 2011; Singer, 2011; Nikolic et al., 2013; Buzsaki and Schomburg, 2015).
Gamma oscillations arise from the interplay between inhibitory and excitatory
neurons in the circuitry of the cortex (Tiesinga and Sejnowski, 2009). While many regions
of the nervous system across many different species display local gamma oscillations
(Bosman et al., 2014), it is the synchronization of gamma oscillations between specific and
distal cortical regions via recurrent connections that uniquely defines the quality of the
feelings correlated with them (Orpwood, 2013). It is not yet known how these selfregulatory oscillations may generate the pain sensation; however, strong functional
interconnectivity between discrete cortical regions is essential for pain.
A cortical neural signature of human pain is consistent with recent observations
that the resting state of the conscious brain is defined by a dynamic spatiotemporal
network of cortically active areas (Barttfeld et al., 2015). While the activity level of this
network fluctuates transiently, there is a hub of activity that emerges over longer time
frames that provides a unique signature of the resting state. General cortical activity,
cortical binding by synchrony and convergence, and the dynamic exploration of
connectivity across this network all diminish under anaesthesia, as awareness is lost
(Mashour, 2013; Barttfeld et al., 2015). This cortical response to anaesthesia is similar to
the analgesia-mediated reductions in activity of the cortical regions associated with pain
(Wager et al., 2013).
Despite the fact that rats and mice last shared a common ancestor with humans
~90 million years ago (Hedges, 2002), these rodents still possess a cortex (albeit a smooth
rather than a folded one) as well as many cortical regions homologous to those in humans.
Despite their phylogenetic separation, rats also exhibit a network of neural activity
involving cortical regions similar to those of humans when humans are exposed to stimuli
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that cause pain (Thompson and Bushnell, 2012). The evolutionary conservation of this
cortical pain signature further supports the idea that the cortex plays a significant role in
the sensation of pain throughout vertebrate phylogeny. This conservation of function is
further supported by experimental studies that indicate a causal role of the cortex in pain.
Core network of cortical activity during pain. Identifying cortical regions that become
active during pain is merely correlative, and while they may be beneficial as biomarkers
for pain, they do not provide insight into the underlying causal basis of pain. The activity
in these cortical regions needs to be experimentally manipulated in order to begin to
understand their role in pain. While experimentally manipulating brain activity in humans
has ethical implications, considerable insight has been obtained by examining the effects
of physical lesions to cortical regions as a result of stroke, tumours or brain surgery.
Overall, this approach has provided strong support for the causal role of specific cortical
regions in human pain (Biemond, 1956; Berthier et al., 1988; Ploner et al., 1999;
Veldhuijzen et al., 2010; Garcia-Larrea, 2012a and 2012b; Vierck et al., 2013).
Lesion analyses reveal that the insular cortex is one of the core components of the
network of cortical regions that underlie the sensation of pain. Early studies revealed that
lesions to the operculo-insular cortex either caused or resulted in the loss of pain
depending on their location and severity (Biemond, 1956). The parietal operculum is the
cortical region that is adjacent to the insular cortex and contains SII, another core
component of the neural signature of pain. Lesions to the operculo-insular cortex can also
cause central pain syndrome (pain in the absence of peripheral noxious stimuli; GarciaLarrea, 2012a and 2012b). It should be noted that not all insular lesions alter pain
sensation or produce the same symptoms: the site and size of the lesion and associated
damage outside the region also tend to influence clinical outcome (Bassetti et al., 1993;
Greenspan et al., 1999; Starr et al., 2009; Garcia-Larrea 2012b; Veldhuijzen et al., 2010;
Baier et al., 2014).
The role of SI in pain has been conclusively demonstrated by numerous clinical
studies of lesions (Cerrato et al., 2005; Vierck et al., 2013). Focal lesions to SI cause
sensory loss of pain in discrete regions of the body and indicate that this cortical region is
indeed necessary to feel pain (Cerrato et al., 2005). However, both the lesion location and
the extent of the lesion also clearly influence the resulting symptoms experienced by the
patient. Vierck et al. (2013) highlighted how partial ablations of SI (that do not remove
the 3a subregion) can lead to only temporary deficiency in the feeling of pain. Removal of
both areas 3a and 3b/1 of SI is required for complete permanent loss of pain (Vierck et
al., 2013). SI is considered to be involved principally in the spatial localisation of pain and
is perhaps only indirectly responsible for pain sensation by conveying neural activity to
other cortical regions (Laureys, 2005; Neirhaus et al., 2015). Nonetheless, SI is clearly
necessary for pain, and its role in the neural signature of pain further confirms the cortical
origins of pain.
Examining the effects of cortical lesions arising from tumours and stroke on human
pain is difficult since lesion size and location produces considerable variability in clinical
symptoms (Berthier et al., 1988). However, discrete chemical lesions to specific cortical
regions can easily be executed and verified in rats, where they have been used to
demonstrate the roles of both the anterior cingulate (Johansen et al., 2001; Qu et al., 2011)
and insular cortices (Benison et al., 2011; Coffeen et al., 2011) in pain. These experimental
studies are beginning to reveal the phylogenetic conservation of a select network of
cortical regions in pain from rodents to humans.
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Stimulation of the cortex elicits pain. Direct electrical stimulation of the cortex in awake
patients undergoing brain surgery has provided direct evidence for a causal role of the
cortex in human pain. This approach was pioneered by Wilder Penfield and initially
involved the use of surface electrodes to map the function of specific cortical regions
during brain surgery. Later studies progressed to the use of intracortical depth electrodes
and then, more recently, implantable electrodes that are activated after surgery
(Selimbeyoglu and Parvizi, 2010). Penfield found that it was typically difficult to elicit
sensations by direct stimulation of the cortex (Penfield and Perot, 1963). These results
were most likely related to the complex dynamics of neural activity in the cortex required
for pain and to limitations of accessibility of cortical regions to surface electrodes.
Similar difficulties in perceiving complex visual images have been reported
following stimulation of the visual cortices (Lee et al., 2000). Only ~5% of all electrode
placements elicit complex visual scenes such as faces. Nonetheless, patients did
sometimes perceive the feeling of pain when the temporal cortex was stimulated. Patients
were known to exclaim “pain in my forehead” or “I had a little pain in my forehead”
(Penfield and Perot, 1963). When the insular cortex was stimulated, some patients
reported visceral sensations such as pain, nausea and scratching (Penfield and Faulk,
1955). Most often the somatic sensations were described as “tingling,” “shock,”
“numbness,” or “tightness.” The role of the insular cortex in producing human pain has
subsequently been repeatedly confirmed by numerous clinical studies involving direct
electrical stimulation (Ostrowsky et al., 2002; Duffau et al., 2006; Afif et al., 2008; Mazzola
et al., 2009; Stephani et al., 2011; Afif et al., 2012; Mazzola et al., 2012; Mazzola et al.,
2014). In addition, non-invasive stimulation of the cortex using transcranial magnetic
stimulation has revealed roles of SII in encoding pain intensity (Lockwood et al., 2013)
and SI in pain localization (Porro et al., 2007).
Rodent studies have begun to provide new insight into the cell and molecular bases
of pain using modern genetic tools (Daou et al., 2013). Gu et al. (2015) selectively
activated inhibitory neural circuitry in the anterior cingulate cortex using optogenetic
stimulation and found overall reduced neural activity in this cortical region was
associated with reduced pain. Neuropathic pain in a mouse model has been shown to be
associated with synaptic plasticity in the insular cortex (Qui et al., 2014). Specifically this
plasticity was caused by long-term increases in the amount of synaptic N-methyl-Dasparate receptor (NMDAR) in the insular cortex. Subsequent mouse knock-in
experiments also revealed that increased expression of the AMPA receptor in the insular
cortex was responsible for long-term potentiation of glutamate transmission during
neuropathic pain (Qui et al., 2014). Together, these observations suggest that inhibiting
glutamate receptor function in the cortex could have therapeutic value in pain. In
summary, there is now strong evidence from human clinical investigations and rodent
experimentation that there is a network of cortical regions that plays a causal role in pain.
Putative evidence presented as contrary to cortical localization of pain. There are
two lines of evidence that superficially appear to be inconsistent with the conclusion that
pain arises in the cortex. This evidence has been used to argue that pain is generated in
the lower, and phylogenetically older, regions of the brain, such as the brainstem. First,
there are clinical reports of children lacking much of their cerebral cortices who seem to
display behaviours that would suggest being able to feel; and second, there are adults with
pathological lesions in which much of their insular cortex has been ablated and yet they
still feel pain. However, more careful examination of these reports as well as other clinical
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case studies indicates that these two lines of evidence are inadequate and do not
invalidate claims that the cortex is responsible for pain.
Examination of four rare cases of children born with near-complete absence of the
cerebral cortex (i.e., hydranencephaly) revealed that they displayed a variable mix of
motor behaviours such as smiling, giggling, heads turning to sound, and visual fixation
and tracking of objects (Shewmon et al., 1999; Werth, 2007). On the basis of these
observations, it has been concluded that consciousness and feelings (such as visual qualia
and pain) are independent of the cerebral cortex and arise at the level of the brainstem
(Panksepp, 2011; Damasio and Carvalho, 2013). However, in contrast to these specific
case studies, most hydranencephalic children are moribund (Barnet et al., 1966) and
visually blind (Hill et al., 1961; Werth, 2008). In fact, most individuals with this syndrome
die in utero or within weeks of birth (Pavone et al., 2014; Short and Kardan, 2014).
Patients who survive longer are typically in vegetative states, and hence unaware of their
environments, and have spastic quadriparesis (McAbee et al., 2000; Rados et al., 2014).
What needs to be appreciated is that heterogeneity in behavioural phenotypes arises from
an underlying heterogeneity in the severity of neuroanatomical deficiencies in these
children (Barnet et al., 1966; Aylward et al., 1978; Shewmon et al., 1999; Werth, 2007).
Typically, most of these children still possess some cerebral cortex, suggesting that those
with more overt behaviours could have more functional cortical tissue. A recent review of
the literature has revealed that 70% of hydraencephalics have occipital lobe remnants
and 40% have frontobasal lobe remnants (Cecchetto et al., 2013). Consequently, it is
difficult to relate function to the cortex in these children without very detailed
neuroanatomical and physiological analyses.
Concluding that the cortex does not produce feelings (i.e., pain) because that
function remains when the cortex is purportedly ablated requires, at the very least, that
the cortex be totally ablated. This need for ensuring complete loss of a brain region is
highlighted by experiments in the rodent olfactory system. The olfactory nerve fibres from
the nose project into the brain and terminate in synaptic glomeruli in the olfactory bulb.
In order to assess the ability of animals to smell without an olfactory bulb, this structure
was physically removed by surgery. However, when small fragments of the bulbs were
left intact (~20% glomeruli were present), animals discriminated between odorants
similarly to sham-operated controls (Lu and Slotnick, 1998). These results demonstrate
that even small rudiments of brain regions can perform remarkable functions, and they
illustrate the importance of not over-interpreting the significance of behaviours in
hydranencephalic children when lesions are not complete. The conclusion that feelings
are perceived subcortically (Panksepp, 2011; Damasio and Carvalho, 2013) then becomes
questionable, especially when it is based upon observations of a heterogenous and small
population of hydranencephalic children who do not completely lack cerebral cortices
(Shewmon et al., 1999). It is interesting that Shewmon et al. (1999) actually noted the
difficulty in extrapolating from their observations and merely suggested that these
children should be given the “benefit of the doubt” with respect to awareness.
Putting aside the problems associated with lesion heterogeneity, it is well known
that the visuomotor behaviours reported in congenitally decorticate children by
Shewmon et al. (1999) are reflexively controlled by the mid- and hind-brain and are not
signs of conscious neural processing (Pasik et al., 1969; Dalby et al., 1970; Ferrier and
Cooper, 1976). For instance, these children exhibited visual saccades to an object (e.g.,
mother’s face) that suddenly appeared in their visual fields, and were then able to remain
fixated on the object. Experiments in monkeys have shown that the midbrain retinotectal
pathway guides the saccades to the object even after the visual cortex is ablated (Kato et
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al., 2011). These results strongly demonstrate that monkeys are able to locate objects in
their environment in the absence of visual consciousness (Stoerig, 2001; Silvanto, 2014).
Recently it was shown that the superior colliculi in monkeys respond rapidly to face and
face-like stimuli (Nguyen et al., 2014). The subsequent maintenance of the gaze on an
object is called fixation and is also executed subcortically (without awareness) by bilateral
activation of the superior colliculi (Goffart et al., 2012). Given that mammalian conscious
vision occurs in the cortex, the visual behaviours in hydranencephalic children (provided
they truly lack cortical tissue) must occur non-consciously, mediated by the midbrain
superior colliculus.
The idea that the brainstem is the origin of emotional feelings such as pain, as
proposed by Panksepp and Damasio (Panksepp, 2011; Damasio and Carvalho, 2013), is
further weakened from observations in patients with analgetic thalamic syndrome. These
individuals have hemiparesis and sensory loss on the contralateral side to a thalamic
infarct and exhibit an absence of evoked potentials in the somatosensory cortex in
response to painful stimuli (Maugiere and Desmedt, 1988; Wessel et al., 1994). Thus, the
transmission of neural activity associated with painful stimuli is blocked from reaching
the primary somatosensory cortex (SI). This loss of cortical connectivity causes loss of
pain sensation. These results demonstrate that pain is not generated by either brainstem
or subcortical structures since these structures remain intact in these patients. These
patients also have normal subcortical (non-thalamic) pathways to the cortex that would
allow reporting of sensations. These results are also consistent with the loss of pain that
occurs following localised cortical infarcts that preserve brainstem and subcortical
pathways. Consequently, suggesting that pain is generated subcortically, or in the
brainstem, and that its associated neural activity only reaches the cortex to subserve other
functions is not consistent with available evidence (Devor et al., 2014).
The extrapolation that hydranencepahlic children feel emotions subcortically
because they smile, giggle or laugh (Panksepp, 2011; Damasio and Carvalho, 2013) is also
unfounded, as these motor behaviours can be executed involuntarily by innate reflex
pathways in the brainstem as well as voluntarily by the cortex. For instance, patients with
focal infarcts of the brain stem do not smile involuntarily in response to emotional stimuli
(Cerrato et al., 2003). However, these patients have no problems smiling voluntarily
(Cerrato et al., 2003). This syndrome is referred to as “emotional facial paresis.” Reflexive
smiling is controlled by the medulla in the brainstem, whereas voluntary smiling is
dependent on an intact pyramidal pathway from the motor cortex. The importance of
distinguishing between instinctive behaviours generated by the brainstem and felt
emotions generated by the cortex has been previously discussed extensively (LeDoux,
2012; LeDoux, 2013; LeDoux, 2014a; LeDoux, 2014b; Rolls, 2014a; Rolls, 2014b; Scott,
2014).
As indicated above, the second line of evidence that has been used to suggest that
the cortex is not responsible for feelings comes from observations of a single human
patient who continued to feel pain, despite extensive bilateral damage to the insular
cortex as well as more modest lesions to various other brain regions (Damasio et al., 2012;
Damasio and Carvalho, 2013). Given that the insular cortex is a central part of the cortical
neural signature of pain, it has been suggested that the insular cortex is therefore not
essential for pain and that feelings arise subcortically, most likely in the brainstem
(Damasio and Carvalho, 2013). This conclusion was based on observations of a single
patient without quantitative sensory testing or functional magnetic imaging of the
lesioned brain during sensory stimulation (Damasio et al., 2012).
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Despite extensive destruction of the insula, this patient could still perceive pain,
and anecdotal evidence suggested the patient was perhaps overly sensitive to noxious
stimuli. However, other cortical regions associated with pain such as SI, SII, portions of
the cingulate cortex, and the dorsolateral frontal orbital cortex remained undamaged in
this patient. Damasio et al. (2012) were reasonably circumspect in their discussion of this
patient and did indicate that these regions may be sufficient to generate the feeling of pain.
More recently, a second patient with extensive, but not complete, bilateral lesions of the
insular cortex has also been reported to feel pain (Feinstein et al., 2015). Quantitative
sensory testing revealed that this patient had a heightened sensitivity to pain, as
suggested by the patient described by Damasio et al. (2012). Unfortunately, functional
magnetic imaging was not conducted during pain in this patient (Feinstein et al., 2015).
Imaging would have provided valuable insights into the plasticity of the cortical signature
of pain.
The observations of the patients described by Damasio et al. (2012) and Feinstein
et al. (2015) have to be placed within the context of other patients with cortical lesions.
Berthier et al. (1988) described six patients who all had insular cortex lesions together
with damage to various other cortical regions. These patients all exhibited asymbolia for
pain, which involved a lack of appropriate withdrawal response and inadequate
emotional response to painful stimuli applied anywhere over the body. These patients
could all recognize a painful stimulus as painful but did not experience the unpleasant
sensations associated with it. Clearly, specific cortical regions are essential for the
unpleasantness of pain, but these regions are distinct from the ones responsible for the
detection of a stimulus as painful.
These observations are consistent with the idea that the sensation of pain relies on
multiple parallel pathways processing separate aspects of the stimulus, such as
discriminative and affective components (Melzack, 1999). Interestingly, one of the
patients described by Berthier et al. (1988) had a restricted lesion involving the posterior
insular cortex and parietal operculum, suggesting that both of these regions are integral
to feeling pain. Berthier et al. (1987) also described a patient who exhibited a total lack of
pain unpleasantness on the left side of their body following a restricted lesion to the right
insula and surrounding tissue. These observations suggest that the identification of a
painful stimulus is not dependent upon the normally unpleasant feeling arising from the
stimulus. It indicates that pain can be distinguished by the intensity and the nature (e.g.,
feeling of sharpness or dullness) of the stimulus without the need for the feeling of
unpleasantness. Similar dissociation of submodalities of a stimulus has been reported in
other sensory systems, such as hearing (Roeser and Daly, 1974).
An analysis of 24 patients with partial unilateral insular cortical lesions revealed
quantitative increases in the pain thresholds for heat and cold (Baier et al., 2014). Starr et
al. (2009) also reported that the pain threshold for heat on the lesioned side was markedly
higher than the unlesioned side in one of two patients with extensive (but not complete)
unilateral insular cortex lesions. The second patient reported not feeling pain on either
side in response to cold stimuli, even at 0°C. Interestingly, functional magnetic imaging of
both patients revealed unusually high activity in SI ipsilateral to the side of the body
receiving the noxious stimulus. These results suggest that the sensation of pain might
have been affected by commissural connections.
It is very rare, and probably impossible, to identify patients who completely and
selectively lack a single and specific brain region, such as the insular cortex. There is
always collateral damage or partial remnants remaining that weaken inferences. When
interpreting observations from these studies it is important to note that a structure such
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as the insular cortex has subdomains that can each exhibit different functions (Weich et
al., 2014). Since some of these functions could facilitate pain while others may reduce
pain, it is possible that loss of the whole structure and/or other cortical regions would not
have the expected consequences as a focal lesion. Nonetheless, if we ignore these
important issues, and instead assume that selective loss of the whole insular cortex is
possible and that pain is not lost, what then does it reveal about the role of the insular
cortex?
This observation merely informs us that the network of brain regions associated
with pain can function when one, or more, of its nodes are lost. Computational modelling
of cortical networks has already begun to reveal the extent of their resilience to targeted
lesions (Alstott et al., 2009; Horwitz et al., 2013). Such redundancy is valuable in any
complex system and is consistent with other biological processes such as gene regulation
(Glassman, 1987). Gene regulatory networks involving multiple feedback and
feedforward interactions can often continue to operate normally when one or more genes
are ablated (Tschopp and Duboule, 2011; Zhang, 2012).
Pain involves conscious neural processing. Given that the cortex is both necessary and
sufficient for the feeling of pain in humans, the question now becomes: what are the
unique functional properties of the cortex that are responsible for pain? Since pain is the
conscious (felt) neural processing of noxious stimuli, we should, in the first instance, be
asking what are the defining properties of conscious processing in the human cortex.
Conscious processing is dependent on at least two non-mutually exclusive processes:
signal amplification and global integration across the surface of the cerebral cortex
(Dehaene et al., 2014; Pritchett et al., 2015). Amplification provides a mechanism to
increase signal-to-noise ratio and to produce ongoing neural activity after the initial
sensory stimulus has ceased (Murphy and Miller, 2009).
Global integration ensures the propagation and sharing of neural information so
that the most appropriate response is generated in the context of current and past
experiences. Global integration has both temporal and spatial characteristics that allow
neural activity to be filtered, summated, and averaged over time (temporal) and across
cortical regions (space). This integration involves functional connectivity between distant
cortical regions (exhibiting segregated local neural processing) (Park and Friston, 2013).
Functional connectivity refers to temporally correlated neural activity (usually measured
indirectly, such as by magnetic resonance imaging in humans) between specific regions
across the cortical surface (Friston et al., 1993; Biswal et al., 1995).
Recently, the amount of information transferred across distant sites within the
cortex has been quantified using electroencephalography. These quantitative values have
been successfully used to distinguish between conscious, minimally-conscious and nonconscious patients (Casali et al., 2013; King et al., 2013; Sitt et al., 2014). With respect to
sensory perception, Godwin et al. (2015) demonstrated that visual awareness of a simple,
small, grey disc resulted in increased functional connectivity across broad regions of the
cortex. Thus, global integration mediated by functional connectivity is a critical defining
feature of conscious processing. Functional connectivity analyses of humans in response
to thermal pain have revealed strong connectivity across a large brain network, including
regions previously associated with the neural signature of pain, such as the insula, SI, SII,
cingulate gyrus, and prefrontal cortex (Peltz et al., 2011). Thus, global integration is
consistent with the dynamic neural signature of pain within the cortex. Computational
analyses of functional magnetic resonance imaging signals have enabled the effective
connectivity between cortical regions to be characterised (Zhan and Yu, 2015; Park and
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Friston, 2013). Effective connectivity provides a causal basis of integration across
neuronal populations; it defines whether neural activity in one population of neurons
causes activity in another population. Such methods are being used to decipher the causal
propagation of neural activity through cortical regions during global cortical integration
associated with pain (Liang et al., 2011; Kalberlah et al., 2013; Khoshnejad et al., 2014).
In summary, the cortex has come to be viewed in a hierarchical manner as
segregated modules or communities (neuronal populations such as cortical subregions)
where neuronal integration and amplification perform specific local functions (Sporns,
2013). These modules are interconnected in forming networks or hubs of activity that
enable mesoscale integration (e.g., between SI and SII). Finally, global integration involves
functional connectivity across large regions of the cortex.
Structure determines function. What neural architectures enable the cortex to perform
signal amplification and global integration? While local circuitries in many brain regions
perform signal amplification, the cortex also possesses a unique long-distance selective
attention pathway arising in the fronto-parietal cortices that is able to amplify neural
signals in other cortical regions so that they can be felt (Boly et al., 2011; Lobanov et al.,
2013). Global integration is dependent on the propagation of neural activity across the
cortex via extensive reciprocal interconnections (axon tracts). These pathways propagate
both feedforward and feedback activities (involving both excitatory and inhibitory
signals) (Douglas, 1995; Ganguli et al., 2008; Murphy and Miller, 2009). Thus, a defining
structural feature underlying the feeling of pain is the strong and direct reciprocal
interconnectivity between disparate cortical regions performing pain-related neural
computations.
The strength of these interconnections is clearly depicted by the extent of axon
innervation and synaptic contributions in any one cortical region arising from other
cortical regions. We know from detailed neuroanatomical analyses in the visual system
that the primary visual cortex (V1) receives 10 times more input from V2 then from the
thalamus via the retina. Moreover, input from all other visual areas is twice that from V2
onto upper layer V1 pyramidal cells (Muckli and Petro, 2013). Thus, interconnections
between cortical regions far outweigh those received from sensory stimuli. These
observations highlight the importance of feedforward and feedback circuitry in cortical
function. In particular, perturbation of these reciprocal connections disrupts visual
awareness (Silverstein, 2015).
For pain to have any survival value, it must be mapped to specific body locations.
The SI and SII sensory cortices possess topographical maps of the body that process
information associated with the somatosensory system. It has been proposed that slight
offsets of these maps for different sensations (at least in human SI) have to allow
integration of different qualities (e.g., touch and nociception; Mancini et al., 2012; Haggard
et al., 2013). This idea has gained considerable support based on recent high-resolution
mapping in primates (Vierck et al., 2013). It has been shown that different submodalites
of pain, such as sharp-pricking pain and dull-burning pain, are mapped in different
subregions of SI. Moreover, local lateral interactions between these subregions
significantly alter their relative levels of neural activity (Vierck et al., 2013).
Somatotopic maps of noxious stimuli also exist in the anterior and posterior
insular cortex (Brooks et al., 2005; Baumgartner et al., 2010). Separate somatotopic maps
are present in noxious stimuli for pinprick and heat within the human anterior insular
cortex (Baumgartner et al., 2010). This segregation of sensory inputs raises the possibility
that integration occurs between these two sub-modalities and also allows these sub-
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modalities to be integrated with emotional information that reaches the anterior insular
cortex (Damasio et al., 2000; Baumgartner et al., 2010; Gu et al., 2010, 2013; Frot et al.,
2014).
Amplification and global integration are also dependent on the local microcircuitry
in each cortical region (Gilbert, 1983). The local cytoarchitecture of the cortex (the
presence of discrete lamina and columnar organisation) is capable of simultaneously
maintaining both the differentiation and spatiotemporal relationships of neural signals.
For example, separate features or qualities of sensory stimuli can be partitioned to
different lamina while the columnar organization enables these signals to be integrated.
Both short- and long-range connections between columns provide additional levels of
integration. The six-layered neocortex is well suited for this neural processing. Signals
from the thalamus terminate in layer 4 and are then passed vertically to layer 2 within a
minicolumn. Activity is then projected to layer 5 within the same minicolumn. Strong
inhibitory circuits involving interneurons refine the flow of information through this
canonical microcircuit (Wolf et al., 2014). The layer 2 neurons project to other cortical
regions (local and long-distance) while layer 5 neurons preferentially project to
subcortical regions.
The importance of both local and long-distance recurrent feedback in cortical
decision making and visuomotor behaviours has been confirmed by computational
modeling studies (Sussillo, 2014). Artificial neural networks incorporating recurrent
feedback are able to replicate complex neurophysiological data obtained from the monkey
prefrontal cortex during the performance of sensorimotor tasks (Mante et al., 2013). Such
theoretical and computational approaches are leading to a better understanding of the
cortical neurocytoarchitecture necessary to perform conscious neural processing
(Martinet et al., 2011; Cox and Dean, 2014; Huang et al., 2015).
Taken together, conscious neural processing involves signal amplification and
global integration and arises in the human cortex because of its unique neural
architecture. It is proposed here that only vertebrate nervous systems possessing all of
the following neuroanatomical features are capable of feeling pain:
1.

2.

3.

4.

There must be parcellation of neural tissue into regions with architectures
capable of performing pain-related neural computations (e.g., attention,
discrimination, localisation, duration, intensity, unpleasantness, valence and
motivational value).
There also needs to be laminated and columnar organization of canonical neural
circuits within neural regions performing pain-related neural computations to
allow both differentiation between inputs and preservation of their
spatiotemporal relationships. The lamina must possess strong local inhibitory
interneuron circuits to filter information. The columns must be capable of
integrating various inputs and the laminae also need to convey filtered inputs
and integrated outputs to either higher or lower hierarchical regions.
Topographical coding of different qualities of somatosensory information in
neural regions performing pain-related neural computations should be present.
Circuitry must exist that integrates different somatosensory modalities (e.g.,
light touch versus pain) and sub-modalities (e.g., sharp versus dull pain).
Strong reciprocal (i.e., feedforward and feedback) excitatory and inhibitory
interconnections between neural regions performing pain-related neural
computations as well as other contextually relevant neural processing must also
be present (e.g., vision, motor, and working memory).
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Fish Lack the Neural Architecture for Feeling Pain
Given the proposition that the above organizational principles are necessary for conscious
neural processes of pain, and that fish lack many of these prerequisite neuroanatomical
features, it is reasonable to conclude that fish do not feel pain. Most notably, fish lack the
parcellation of the nervous system into distinct regions with architectures capable of
performing pain-related computations; fish also lack a laminated and columnar
organization of neural regions that are strongly interconnected by reciprocal feedforward
and feedback circuitry.
The fish pallium typically has a small number of structurally discrete regions
(some of which are associated with specific sensory stimuli; Northcutt et al., 2004; Ahrens
et al., 2013). However, these regions are non-laminated and they are only diffusely
interconnected (Giassi et al, 2012). Although the medial pallium is weakly homologous to
the mammalian amygdala, these structures principally possess feedforward circuits that
execute nociceptive defensive behaviours (Broglio et al., 2005; Duvarci and Pare, 2014;
Janak and Tye, 2015). This conclusion is supported by lesion studies that have shown that
neither the medial pallium nor the whole pallium is required for escape behaviours from
electric shock stimuli in fish (Portavella et al., 2004). Therefore, given that the pallium is
not even involved in nociceptive behaviours, it could not be inferred that it plays a role in
pain.
While the fish retina projects diffusely to nine nuclei in the diencephalon, its main
target is the midbrain optic tectum (Burrill and Easter, 1994). Thus, the fish visual system
is highly parcellated, at least, in the sub-telencephalonic regions. Whole brain imaging
during visuomotor reflexes reveals widespread neural activity in the diencephalon,
midbrain and hindbrain in zebrafish, but these regions appear to act mostly as
feedforward pathways (Sarvestani et al., 2013; Kubo et al., 2014; Portugues et al., 2014).
When recurrent feedback is present (e.g., in the brainstem circuitry responsible for eye
movement), it is weak and usually arises only from the next nucleus within a linear
hierarchical circuit (Joshua and Lisberger, 2014). In conclusion, fish lack the strong
reciprocal and networked circuitry required for conscious neural processing.
Interestingly, the midbrain optic tectum possesses topographic maps, is probably the
most highly complex laminated structure in the fish brain, and is capable of integrating a
variety of sensorimotor inputs (Robles et al., 2013). However, its ablation does not affect
escape responses to either touch or electric shock (Yager et al., 1977). Consequently, the
tectum is not involved in nociception and it cannot be concluded that it mediates pain.
A rebuttal to the argument that fish lack the necessary neuroanatomy for feeling
pain is that fish have evolved other brain structures to perform pain-related neural
processing. That is, while humans have evolved the cortex to feel pain, fish have instead
evolved other brain regions to execute the function of pain. Given that there is no evidence
for the emergence of novel pain regions in the fish nervous system, it must be assumed
that there is a major restructure of existing neural regions in fish to accommodate their
additional roles in pain. However, as noted earlier, most of the fish nervous system
circuitry is constructed using feedforward pathways that allow rapid execution of unfelt
motor programs subserving survival behaviours (Amo et al., 2014; Joshua and Lisberger,
2014; Bianco and Engert, 2015).
An alternative hypothesis as to why fish do not need the architecture of a human
cortex to feel pain is because fish do not feel “human pain,” but instead they feel “fish pain.”
Consequently, a cortex-like architecture is not considered necessary for fish to feel pain.
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Interestingly, many people, because of anthropomorphic tendencies, will instinctively
endow fish with the ability to feel pain simply because they attempt to escape from
noxious stimuli. To indicate that fish do not then feel like humans seems rather
contradictory to this anthropomorphism (Key, 2015a). The proposition that fish feel “fish
pain” (or pain by any other name, such as “raw experience” or “primitive feelings”) is not
an argument for fish feeling with another part of their brain. If “fish pain” existed, it would
need to be consciously processed using at least the minimal neural architecture described
above. Thus, in the absence of this architecture, fish cannot feel any sort of pain. Fish
clearly respond to noxious stimuli, and they do so by using feedforward circuitry to
execute motor programs. While these behaviours are subject to operant learning using
noxious stimuli, they are executed in the absence of feeling pain.
Conclusion
In the Introduction, I indicated that there is a lack of evidence for fish feeling pain. This
has partly been the result of inappropriate use of innate defensive behaviours as a proxy
measure of fish feeling pain. This problem is not limited to fish studies. It is recognized
that a vast majority of rodent pain studies inappropriately assess reflex behaviours such
as tail flick and paw shaking (Barrett, 2015). Consequently, it has been suggested,
behaviours that are more indicative of the feeling of pain need to be examined. One
suggestion is that the behavioural assay should involve the analysis of loss of a normal
behaviour (e.g., feeding or locomotion) rather than the performance of a reflex behaviour
(e.g., escape response) (Barrot, 2012; Barrett, 2015). This idea stems from the
observation that in humans pain normally tends to be restrictive rather than inducing a
specific activity. For instance, human pain usually restricts spontaneous locomotion and
perturbs sleep. This has led to a call for animal studies of pain to assess pain-suppressed
rather than pain-elicited behaviours. Particular attention should be focused on
behaviours relevant for the species under examination.
Given the above concerns about behavioural assays, it is interesting to assess
reports of pain-suppressed behaviours in fish in response to surgical interventions known
to cause pain in humans. One example of surgery that has been commonly employed in
both humans and fish is craniotomy (removal of a portion of skull bone in order to access
the brain). In humans, craniotomy typically results in post-surgery pain (verbal reports)
(de Gray and Matta, 2005; Roberts, 2005) that diminishes social and physical functioning
and leads to an overall reduction in quality of life (Betchen et al., 2003; Rocha-Filho et al.,
2008). The gross sensorimotor and locomotor functional deficits observed in rodents
following this same surgery (Cole et al., 2011; Lagraoui et al., 2012; Sashindranath et al.,
2015) are consistent with the post-craniotomy suppressed behaviours reported by
humans. These results lend support to the idea that rodents, like humans, also experience
post-craniotomy pain.
What about fish? Do they have suppressed species-specific behaviours after
craniotomy? Craniotomy has widely been used in studies involving lesions of the fish
brain. In some experiments, the surgery is rather crude and simply involves pushing a
hypodermic needle through the cranium and into the forebrain (Kroehne et al., 2011;
Kishimoto et al., 2012; Kyritis et al., 2012). Interestingly, after such a stab wound injury,
fish continue to exhibit qualitatively normal behaviours; there is no observable
suppression of their feeding, swimming and mating behaviours (Schmidt et al., 2014),
suggesting that they are not experiencing post-craniotomy pain. Craniotomy also has no
effect on specific behaviours of different fish species. For instance, blind cavefish exhibit
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distinct exploratory behaviours when placed into new environments. These behaviours
involve time course changes in swim speed and location preference that lead to
habituation to novelty. None of these quantitative behaviours were affected by
craniotomy, which in this case was performed by drilling a hole in the cranium (Riedel,
1998). Male paradise fish exhibit specific sociosexual courtship behaviours and foamnest
building and maintenance. Craniotomy in these fish did not affect feeding, swimming,
spawning, courtship behaviours, or building and tending to nests (Davis et al., 1976;
Kassel et al., 1976; Schwagmeyer et al., 1977; Davis et al., 1978). Again, the lack of
suppression of these behaviours is consistent with these fish not feeling pain after
craniotomy.
It is well known that fish can learn to perform motor behaviours using regions of
the forebrain (Demski, 2013) that are weakly homologous to the mammalian
telencephalon. Direct electrical stimulation of these regions can elicit defensive escape
behaviours. However, these observations do not warrant the conclusion that fish have the
ability to feel pain or to suffer fear or anxiety (Key, 2015a). Unfortunately, these erroneous
inferences are strengthened by beliefs that the motivation to perform certain behaviours
is predominantly driven by rewards (either positive or negative). The concept of negative
and positive rewards is embedded both in our culture and in the literature, and it arises
from our first-hand appreciation of the importance of such rewards (typically thought of
as feelings, such as pain and pleasure) in both human basic survival drives as well as
complex behaviours. However, there is no sound biological reason to extend these feelings
to vertebrates that lack the underlying neuroanatomy and physiology responsible for
such feelings in humans.
In the literature it is often suggested that fish feel pain because they can learn to
avoid an electric shock by swimming from one region of a fish tank to another when a
conditioned stimulus (light) is turned on (Salas et al., 2006; Demski, 2013). It is assumed
that fish learn to perform this task because they are motivated by a desire not to
experience the electric shock. Emotive concepts such as “fearful,” “distressed,”
“uncomfortable,” “overwhelming” and “visceral discomfort” have been invoked to
describe the sensations experienced by fish (e.g., see Demski, 2013). That fish have these
feelings has been inferred from the observation that specific lesions to pallial subregions
can disturb escape responses to conditioned light stimuli. It is believed that in the absence
of these pallial regions, a fish no longer feels pain and hence has no motivation to escape
when the light is turned on. However, closer analysis of these experiments revealed that
when lesioned fish failed to respond to the pre-warning light stimulus and were
subsequently electrically shocked, they very quickly exhibited an escape response that
was no different from that of controls (Portavella et al., 2004). Thus, the pallium clearly
has a role in learning to respond to the light stimulus, but not in responding to the electric
shock. These studies support the conclusion that fish do not consciously feel the electric
shock, and that fish instead exhibit innate escape responses involving non-conscious subpallial pathways.
While it may be appropriate to retain the nomenclature of positive and negative
rewards for fish, it should be done in the context of understanding that these animals do
not perform behaviours to be rewarded with pleasurable feelings or alternatively to
escape painful feelings, but they do so because the circuitry has evolved to ensure survival.
The fact that a spinal-cord-lesioned rodent can learn to uniquely position its lower limb
in order to prevent exposure to an electric shock is a classic example of such survival
circuitry (Grau, 2014). This behaviour is executed clearly without feeling, and the shock
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is merely a noxious stimulus that activates neural circuitry that is both beneficial for
survival and indicate of the capacity to learn.
It has been argued here that it is possible to logically and confidently propose the
strong inference, based on principles of evolutionary biology and neuroscience, that fish
do not feel noxious stimuli. I acknowledge that we do not have the tools at present to
definitively “prove” with a single experimental approach that fish do not feel pain. There
are questions in science that are difficult, and simple demonstrations or proof are not
available. For example, we can neither re-run the evolution of multicellular organisms,
nor reconstruct the universe from the big bang, in order to test definitively the standard
scientific models of the origins of animals and the universe. Given that explaining
consciousness is generally considered the hardest problem of neuroscience, it is not
surprising that simple demonstrations or proof are not available. What then do noxious
stimuli feel like to a fish? The evidence best supports the idea that they don’t feel like
anything to a fish.
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The Other Minds Problem: Animal Sentience and Cognition
Overview. Since Descartes, philosophers know there is no way to know for sure what — or whether — others feel (not
even if they tell you). Science, however, is not about certainty but about probability and evidence. The 7.5 billion individual
members of the human species can tell us what they are feeling. But there are 9 million other species on the planet (20
quintillion individuals), from elephants to jellyfish, with which humans share biological and cognitive ancestry, but not one
other species can speak: Which of them can feel — and what do they feel? Their human spokespersons — the comparative
psychologists, ethologists, evolutionists, and cognitive neurobiologists who are the world’s leading experts in “mindreading" other species -- will provide a sweeping panorama of what it feels like to be an elephant, ape, whale, cow, pig, dog,
bat, chicken, fish, lizard, lobster, snail: This growing body of facts about nonhuman sentience has profound implications not
only for our understanding of human cognition, but for our treatment of other sentient species.

Gregory Berns: Decoding the Dog's Mind with Awake
Neuroimaging
Gordon Burghardt: Probing the Umwelt of Reptiles
Jon Sakata: Audience Effects on Communication Signals
PANEL 1: Reptiles, Birds and Mammals
WORKSHOP 1: Kristin Andrews: The "Other" Problems:
Mind, Behavior, and Agency9
Sarah Brosnan: How Do Primates Feel About Their Social
Partners?
Alexander Ophir: The Cognitive Ecology of Monogamy
Michael Hendricks: Integrating Action and Perception in a
Small Nervous System
PANEL 2: Primates, Voles and Worms
WORKSHOP 2: Jonathan Birch: Animal Sentience and the
Precautionary Principle
Malcolm MacIver: How Sentience Changed After Fish
Invaded Land 385 Million Years Ago
Sarah Woolley: Neural Mechanisms of Preference in
Female Songbird
Simon Reader: Animal Social Learning: Implications for
Understanding Others
PANEL 3: Sea to Land to Air
WORKSHOP 3: Steven M. Wise: Nonhuman Personhood
Tomoko Ohyama: Action Selection in a Small Brain
(Drosophila Maggot)
Mike Ryan: "Crazy Love": Nonlinearity and Irrationality in
Mate Choice
Louis Lefebvre: Animal Innovation: From Ecology to
Neurotransmitters
PANEL 4: Maggots, Frogs and Birds: Flexibility Evolving
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Different?
Vladimir Pradosudov: Chickadee Spatial Cognition
Jonathan Balcombe: The Sentient World of Fishes
PANEL 5: Like-Mindedness and Unlike-Mindedness
WORKSHOP 5 (part 1): Gary Comstock: A Cow's Concept
of Her Future
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Physical and Mental Risks to Cattle and Horses in Rodeos

Joshua Plotnik: Thoughtful Trunks: Application of Elephant
Cognition for Elephant Conservation
Lori Marino: Who Are Dolphins?
PANEL 6: Mammals All, Great and Small
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Conversations With a Caterpillar and a Bacterium
PANEL 7: Microbes, Molds and Plants
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Cognition and Why It Matters
James Simmons: What Is It Like To Be A Bat?
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Steve Phelps: Social Cognition Across Species
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